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A SKEPTICAL VIEW OF "PROPERTY RIGHTS"
LEGISLATION
FRANK L MICHELMAN*
Q peaking of contracts with America, I have two of them on my
3 mind: one touted by the new congressional Republican majority,
and the other described a few years ago by Justice Antonin Scalia as
an "historical compact" embedded in American "constitutional cul-
ture."' Item eight of the Republicans' Contract calls for a "Jobs Crea-
tion and Wage Enhancement Act." This call contains, in the fine
print, the promise of what is these days styled a "property rights" law.2
The current vehicles for this promise are H.R. 925 (the "Private Prop-
erty Protection Act of 1995"), a bill approved by the House of Repre-
sentatives on March 3, 1995, and S. 605 (the "Omnibus Property
Rights Act of 1995"), a bill introduced by the Senate leadership on
March 23, 1995. 3 Both of these bills contain proposals to compensate
owners monetarily for regulatory restrictions on the use of property.
H.R. 925 is completely taken up by such a proposal. S. 605, a much
more wide-ranging legislative package, contains proposals of this kind
in two of its four substantive titles.4 Title V of the bill is, as we'll see,
* Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University; Bacon/Kilkenney
Distinguished Visiting Professor, Fordham University School of Law.
1. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2900 (1992).
2. See House Republican Conference, Legislative Digest, "Contract With
America," Sept. 27, 1994, at 33, 36 ("H.R. - allows property owners to receive com-
pensation ... for any reduction in the value of their property.").
3. H.R. 925, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 141 CONG. REC. 2607 (1995); S. 605, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess., 141 CONG. REC. 4497 (1995).
The House-approved version of H.R. 925 differs in some material respects from the
bill as it stood when I first offered these remarks on February 27, 1995. In what fol-
lows, therefore, I have conformed my remarks to the text of the bill as subsequently
amended and approved on the House floor. The Senate leadership bill was intro-
duced very shortly before these remarks were due to the editors of this Journal on
their way to the printer. I have tried, in what follows, to take due account of the
Senate bill as introduced on March 23. Of necessity, however, the main focus here is
on the House bill that I've had before me for a longer time.
By the time this appears in print, the terms of either H.R. 925 or S. 605, or both, or
of whatever Act either of these bills may by then have become, will almost certainly
have undergone further material changes. Readers will have to judge whether any
such changes will have blunted whatever force there is in the basic objections I direct
below to the versions as they stand today, March 27, 1995.
4. In addition to titles II and V described below, title III would provide for alter-
native dispute resolution for taking and compensation controversies, and title IV
would require agencies and the Office of Management and Budget to conduct "pri-
vate property taking impact analyses" of proposed new regulations. See S. 605, supra
note 3.
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in pertinent respects quite similar to H.R. 925.5 Title II, on "Property
Rights Litigation Relief," is quite differently constructed and will re-
quire its own separate discussion.6
H.R. 925 (and S. 605, Title V)
We begin with H.R. 925. Its core provision reads as follows:
[t]he Federal Government shall compensate an owner of property
whose use of any portion of that property has been limited by an
agency action, under a specified regulatory law,7 that diminishes the
fair market value of that portion by 20 percent or more. The
amount of the compensation shall equal the diminution in value
that resulted from the agency action.8
I need to describe certain limitations in the coverage of H.R. 925.
First, the bill stipulates that, for its purposes, the term "property"
means specifically "land."9 The bill thus offers no protection for per-
sonal property holdings. It is anybody's guess, though, whether the
bill would protect pre-regulation values of fixed improvements of
land-manufacturing plants, for example-that lawyers would ordi-
narily class as real estate.10
5. Title V is styled a "Private Property Owners Administrative Bill of Rights."
Id. The title would provide for sundry kinds of protection of private property values
against regulatory diminution, in addition to its requirement, to which these remarks
are specifically directed, of compensation for regulatory devaluations of property
holdings.
In what follows, I will focus mainly on H.R. 925, using footnotes to point out the
close parallels between the compensation scheme of the House-passed bill and that of
title V of the Senate leadership bill as initially introduced.
6. See infra note 36.
7. For the meaning of "specified regulatory law," see infra notes 11-14 and ac-
companying text.
8. H.R. 925, supra note 3, § 3(a) (footnotes added). Cf. title V of S. 605, supra
note 3. Its core compensation provision declares:
[a] private property owner that, as a consequence of a final qualified agency
action of an agency head, is deprived of 33 percent or more of the fair mar-
ket value, or the economically viable use, of the affected portion of the prop-
erty as determined by a qualified appraisal expert, is entitled to receive
compensation in accordance with the standards set forth in section 204 of
this Act.
Id. § 508(a). Section 204 calls for compensation in the amount of the difference be-
tween "the fair market value[s] of the property or portion of property affected"
before and after it became subject to the agency action in question. Id.
§ 204(d)(2)(A).
9. This includes "the right to use water." H.R. 925, supra note 3, § 10(1). Title V
of S. 605 is similar but not identical. Section 502(2)(4)(A) defines "private property
owner" as an owner or holder of "property," while § 502(2)(5) defines "property" as
meaning "(A) land; (B) any interest in land; and (C) the right to use or the right to
receive water." For the possible significance of "(B) any interest in land," see infra
note 22.
10. Only a court could answer authoritatively. As matters stand right now, a court
called on to answer would have little to go on. The Report of the House Committee
on the Judiciary, H.R. Rep. No. 46, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), is totally silent about
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Second, by its terms, the bill applies only to devaluations wrought
by agency actions under three selected laws:" the Clean Water Act,12
the Endangered Species Act, 13 and provisions in the Food Security
Act of 1985 that mandate withdrawal of agricultural price supports
and other benefits from farmers who plant on statutorily defined wet-
lands or "highly erodible lands."' 4 Third, the bill withholds protection
from uses that are defined as nuisances by state law or are already
prohibited by local zoning ordinances, and it makes exceptions for
regulatory actions that have as their "primary purpose" the preven-
tion of either "an identifiable damage to specific [other] property" or
"an identifiable hazard to public health or safety."' 5
H.R. 925 deals with occurrences that amount, in the eyes of the
bill's supporters and defenders, to what are called regulatory takings.
That term refers, of course, to the Fifth Amendment's command that
the government not take private property for public use without pay-
ing for the property taken.'6 Now, it's certainly understandable that
some very severe regulatory restrictions on property use would excite
why, or to what intended effect, "property" has been restrictively defined as meaning
only "land" (including water rights).
11. These three are the "specified regulatory laws" referred to in section 3(a) of
the bill, quoted in the text. The bill would further apply to agency actions under three
additional statutes, but only insofar as those actions restrict an owner's "right to use
or receive water." See H.R. 925, supra note 3, § 10(5)(D).
12. Id. § 10(5)(A) (referring to section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988 & Supp. V 1994)).
13. Id. § 10(5)(B) (referring to the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C.§§ 1531-1544 (1988 & Supp. V 1994)).
14. ld. § 10(5)(C) (referring to title XII of the Food Security Act of 1985, 16
U.S.C. § 3801 et seq. (1988 & Supp. V 1994)). See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3811, 3821.
Again, title V of S. 605 is similar, although a reader has to work a little harder to
pick up the thread. The core compensation provision requires compensation for de-
valuations stemming from "a final... agency action of an agency head." S. 605, supra
note 3, § 508(a); see supra note 8. Section 502(2) defines "agency head" as a person
having "jurisdiction or authority to take a final agency action under the Endangered
Species Act... or section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act ....
The Republicans' Contract promises compensation to "private property owners"
generally, not just to owners of land affected by the two specified statutes. See supra
note 2. Similarly, Majority Leader Robert Dole, introducing S. 605 on the Senate
floor, declared that the bill "would require the Federal Government to compensate
property owners [not just landowners] if Government action [not just action under
two statutes] reduces the value of property [not just land] by one-third." 141 CONG.
REC. S4498. Title V does not, at least as initially drafted, fulfill these commitments.
There are provisions in title II, as initially drafted, that might conceivably be read to
extend the protection to all property and all regulation, but it's far from clear that
such is their intended meaning. See infra note 36.
15. H.R. 925, supra note 3, §§ 4, 5(a). Somewhat comparably, § 508(a) of S. 605
requires compensation "in accordance with the standards set forth in section 204,"
and § 204(d) provides that compensation is not payable for any restriction on a use
that is "a nuisance as commonly understood and defined by background principles of
nuisance and property law, as understood within the State in which the property is
situated." See supra note 8.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation").
'1995]
412 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VI
concerns about constitutional rights to compensation for taken prop-
erty. It'slimportant, however, to notice that the reason for this is not
that treating use-restrictions as compensable takings was any part of
what the Framers of the Fifth Amendment had specifically in mind,
which even Justice Scalia comes close to stipulating it was not.17 Nor
can the direct force of constitutional verbiage explain the rise of the
notion of taking-by-regulation, given that it's obviously something of a
stretch to say that the government takes your land for public use when
what it precisely does is forbid you certain uses of land to which you
continue to hold an exclusive private title.'8
The reason, then, for initially conceiving the possibility of "regula-
tory taking" has to be that we allow broad moral or other purposive
considerations to enter into our determinations of the legal meanings
of constitutional verbiage. A regulatory taking claim is a claim that a
certain governmentally imposed restriction on the use of property
ought, in all constitutional reason, to trigger a governmental duty to
compensate. The claim is an appeal to some relatively lofty general
principle of American constitutionalism.
Typically, in the past, claims of that kind have been addressed to
courts, and the considered judicial response-the much maligned
"balancing test" of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City,'9 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,2 ° and Lu-
cas2 '-has been one that has left unrequited the large preponderance
of complaining landowners. And that, of course, is the beginning-
but not, as we'll soon see, the end-of what H.R. 925 is all about.
H.R. 925 is precisely designed to enable property owners-or, rather,
some property owners, those who own land affected by one of the
three named laws-to bypass the perceived laxities of the protections
that owners have so far been able to obtain from courts. The bill
seeks to accomplish this by setting a sharp and categorical, hence judi-
cially unevadable, line of compensability. Should the bill be enacted,
then whenever that line is crossed, whenever a use-restriction reduces
17. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2900 n.15 (1992)
(agreeing that "early constitutional theorists did not believe the Takings Clause em-
braced regulations of property at all").
18. This is not to say that one can't devise sense-making ways of talking about
regulatory takings-away of "servitudes" or other non-possessory components of a full
liberal title. See infra note 22. It is only to say that regulatory use restrictions are not
"takings of property for public use" in the most straightforward sense of that phrase,
and that the concept of "regulatory taking" depends, therefore, on some attribution
of purpose, not already apparent in the words themselves, to the verbal text of the
constitutional instrument.
19. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
20. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
21. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). The Lucas decision, it must be remembered, retains the
balancing test for all regulatory takings claims save those in which land under regula-
tion is stripped of all economically viable use. Cf. Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct.
1522, 1526 (1992) (discussing claims of "physical" takings).
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by twenty percent or more the market value of any "portion" of a land
parcel, compensation will be legally due, even if the case is one where
a court would have concluded that the unbolstered Constitution does
not require any compensation at all."
Now, it can hardly be denied that H.R. 925 means to confer a very
palpable benefit on the favored segment of property owners who
would enjoy its protections. Of course, I mean the benefit consisting
of the compensation money to which H.R. 925 will on occasion entitle
these owners (should the bill or something like it become law), to
which they would not otherwise have had any legal claim. What is
supposed to justify conferral of this benefit at taxpayer expense on
these statutorily sculpted subsets of citizens?
The question is important, because one undoubted clause in the
American constitutional compact is that Congress, like other legisla-
tive bodies, is supposed not to "waste" the taxpayers' money-a tech-
nical term meaning not to spend it on any non-public purpose. Many
opponents of the kind of legislation represented by H.R. 925 say that
to hand over public funds to particular landowners whose land-uses
have been restricted by regulatory laws, when that's not required by
the Constitution's own standard of fairness as judicially ascertained,
violates this plain duty not to give away public money to political
favorites.
How do supporters respond? They don't rest with ordinary political
arguments. They don't say, for example: well, what H.R. 925 is really
all about is our policy preference for curbing and shrinking the regula-
tory state, and particularly the regulatory state as manifest in certain
laws protecting endangered species and wetlands, that we think espe-
cially repugnant either to public good sense or to certain private inter-
22. Note that this latter class of cases includes not only those in which wetlands
regulations, for example, would modify the otherwise allowable uses of an entire
landholding and thereby reduce its value by, say, 30%. It also includes cases in which
the regulation would leave completely unrestricted 95 one-hundredths of a mostly dry
holding, while substantially restricting the value of the wet five-percent "portion" on
which the use-restriction impinges.
Should it turn out that either Title II or Title V of S. 605 is enacted in something
like its current form, the effect could be even more drastic. Title V defines protected
property as including both "land" and "any interest in land." See supra note 9. Title
II contains the most sweeping imaginable definition of protected property, including
"inchoate interests," "easements," "security interests," "rents, issues, and profits,"
"any interest defined as property under State law," and "any interest understood to
be property based on custom, usage, common law, or mutually reinforcing under-
standings sufficiently well-grounded in law to back a claim of interest." S. 605, supra
note 3, §§ 203(5)(A)(ii), (iv), (vii), (C), (E), (F). Under these definitions, any applica-
tion whatsoever of any sort of land regulation could easily be held compensable, re-
gardless of how marginal its effect on the market value of an affected land parcel, on
the theory that it totally devalues a conceptually severed "interest" in land that com-
mon-law usage and lawyers' customary talk identifies as a servitude or negative ease-
ment. On conceptual severance, see Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of
Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667,
1676 (1988).
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ests we happen to hold in high regard (and stand ready to argue have
a special connection to broader public interests).
No, supporters claim a loftier, more peremptory ground: that of
constitutional morality and obligation. They say the bill will carry out
a constitutional and moral mandate that the government now honors
too much in the breach, that is, to have a decent respect for constitu-
tional rights, and, for that matter, natural rights, of private property.23
And in fact, H.R. 925 proclaims itself an intervention on behalf of an
uncompromising "general policy" to the effect that, and I quote, "no
law or agency should limit the use of privately owned property so as to
diminish its value. 24
One might well ask, as we shall below, how a law in defense of such
a commanding policy as that-a law in defense of such allegedly exi-
gent constitutional and moral rights of property-can in all decency
reserve its protections to owners of land as distinguished from other
property, and, what is considerably more egregious, not even to all
landowners but only to those who chafe under three selected statutes.
A prior question, though, is how much truth there is to the claim that
current practice tramples on constitutional rights for which Americans
have contracted but to which our courts have unfortunately failed to
give full enforcement. I shall very briefly pursue that question taking
Justice Scalia for my Virgil. Just what sort of a private property princi-
ple, I want to ask, really does form a part of what Scalia presents as
the historical American constitutional compact?25
Our text, of course, is Scalia's opinion for the Court in the 1992 case
of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.26  I assume readers
roughly recall how this decision modified the Court's previously reg-
nant balancing test for regulatory takings, by adding a categorical pre-
sumptive rule requiring compensation when regulation denies all
economically beneficial or productive use of a parcel of land.27 Why
23. See, e.g., Senator Orrin G. Hatch's statement on the Senate floor supporting
the introduction of S. 605, 141 CONG. REc. S4497 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1995); Hearings
on H.R. 925 Before the House Subcommittee on the Constitution, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (Feb. 10, 1995) (Statement of Roger Pilon).
According to § 102(1) of S. 605, the bill's "purpose" is to "encourage, support, and
promote the private ownership of property" and ensure "the constitutional and legal
protection" thereof by "the establishment of a new Federal judicial claim in which to
vindicate and protect property rights." Section 101 of the bill contains seven "find-
ings." Six of these (numbers 1-5 and 7) are all concerned solely with celebration and
protection of fundamental rights of private property. According to finding number 6,
"there is a need both to restrain the Federal Government in its overzealous regulation
of the private sector and to protect private property, which is a fundamental right of
the American people."
24. H.R. 925, supra note 3, § 2(a).
25. To be precise, the Justice wrote of the "historical compact recorded in the
Takings Clause that has become part of our constitutional culture." Lucas, 112 S. Ct.
at 2900.
26. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
27. Id. at 2901.
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should the Court, though, have thus drawn the line of presumptive
compensability at the seemingly arbitrary point of total extinguish-
ment of beneficial use of a landholding? By Justice Scalia's own ac-
count, it did so out of a concern to keep constitutional law in tune with
a public constituency's shared, tacit, cultural sense of limits to decency
in government.
Here is what Scalia wrote:
our takings jurisprudence ... has traditionally been guided by the
understandings of our citizens regarding the content of ... the "bun-
dle of rights" that they acquire when they obtain title to property.
It seems to us that the property owner necessarily expects the uses
of his property to be restricted, from time to time, by various meas-
ures newly enacted by the State in legitimate exercise of its police
powers.
28
The clear implication is that thoughts of compensation are, by the
prevalent understanding of Americans, simply out of place in most
instances, if not quite all, of regulatory restrictions of land-use. The
American way, as the Court describes it, is to treat the bulk of these
events as belonging to the normal give-and-take of a progressive and
democratic society; it is to treat regulation as an ordinary part of back-
ground risk and opportunity, against which we all take our chances in
our roles as investors in property. But Scalia did, of course, have a bit
more to say: "we think the notion.., that title [to land] is... subject
to the 'implied limitation' that the State may subsequently eliminate
all economically valuable use is inconsistent with the historical com-
pact recorded in the Takings Clause that has become part of our con-
stitutional culture. ' 29
Look again at that balky sentence. Why this un-Scalia-like orotun-
dity? Only an unusually thorny or baffling problem, it would seem,
could have called forth from this Justice such cloudy, approximative
language.
What, exactly, is the opinion driving at? Here is how I have come
to understand it: the Court accepts a responsibility to deal with taking-
of-property claims in a way that will help sustain public confidence in
the sincerity and reliability of what the opinion calls the historical
compact-meaning, it would appear, historic professions of commit-
ment to respect for common basic principles of constitutional govern-
ment, including, of course, although not limited to, the institution of
private property. The Court is concerned that there are some regula-
tory takings claims that can't be brushed off without undermining
public confidence in the country's commitment to respect for that in-
stitution. And, from its observation of the country's actual constitu-
tional culture, the Court draws the conclusion that tolerance for
28. Id at 2899.
29. Id at 2900 (emphasis added).
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uncompensated total regulatory extinguishment of a land parcel's eco-
nomic value would indeed tend to subvert public belief in sincere
commitment to that part of the compact.
Here, though, is something the Court did not say: it did not say
(rather, it implicitly gainsaid) that the compact includes no principles
or commitments that limit or compete with private property. Cer-
tainly the constitutional compact includes a decent respect for the in-
stitution of private property as one of its terms. No less certainly,
however, does it contain other terms that tend, whether this pleases us
or not, to make regulatory takings claims hard to deal with reasonably
by any kind of categorical rule.
Our constitutional culture includes a deep and ancient tradition of
expected regard, when you make use of your property, for other peo-
ple's and the public's interest and concerns.3" It includes a deep and
ancient strain that says this expectation of regard for public interest
and concerns is subject, when the occasion requires, to legislative defi-
nition and regulatory enforcement, a strain that developed early
under the rubric of public nuisance.31 The tradition, in sum, is one of
a law of property that is functionally oriented to contemporary com-
munity goals, as well as to protection of private advantage, and that
relies on the police powers of legislatures, alongside common law ad-
judication by courts, to negotiate and mediate between the two.
So, for example, in the view of currently prevalent constitutional
culture in many parts of the United States, the seacoast and its natural
terrain are, it would seem, precious assets of public life, assets that no
private individual can fairly expect to engross completely, or can fairly
expect to gain an irrevocable right to endanger, whether certainly or
only probably, whether by building houses nearby or in any other
way.3 It could well be that a great many Americans-maybe most-
would repudiate any expectation on Mr. Lucas' part of having ac-
quired an irrevocable freedom to build in such a place, regardless of
any consequential endangerment of a public interest that political
publics might from time to time come to perceive.
Considerations of this kind are, I believe, endemic in the American
system and practice of government, and I want now to test for their
presence and force by examining more closely the protective scopes of
the "property rights" bills now pending before Congress. When we
peer at H.R. 925 and title V of S. 605, the first burning question is why
their protections are reserved for land value losses33 stemming from
30. See, e.g., FORREST MACDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLEC-
TUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 9-36 (1985).
31. See, e.g., John A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the Takings
Clause, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1993).
32. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY ch. 6 (1994).
33. It is true that Justice Scalia's Lucas opinion reads the historical compact (not
implausibly) as differentiating the expectations of land ownership from those of own-
ership of personal property. On Scalia's reading of the compact, Americans accept
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agency actions under two or three selected laws. On what remotely
principled basis can the protection have been so reserved? My own
answer is "none." That H.R. 925 as passed by the House is playing
political favorites (or political opportunities) seems to me just plain
undeniable.34 But there is, I believe, a further answer to the question
of why the bill's drafters have declined to extend its protection to all
property as affected by all regulation, which is that they know such a
broadly principled bill stands no chance of enactment. No American
Congress would dare enact legislation that would openly, honestly,
and consistently carry out H.R. 925's pretended high moral precept
that government action should never-ever-limit the use of private
property so as in the least to diminish its value,35 because the Ameri-
can public is nowhere near accepting any such precept and it never
has been.36
the risk of total regulatory wipe-outs of personalty value, but not of realty value. See
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900. But there is no comfort there for supporters of H.R. 925,
for the obvious reason that 20% is a far cry from totality. Those who would appeal
for support to Scalia's readings of the compact must take the bitter with the sweet.
34. I'm not contending that a court ought to hold the bill unconstitutional on that
ground. I'm suggesting that the relatively favored constituencies here-owners of
land burdened by the three selected regulatory programs-can't, in principle, even
begin to be regarded as rescuees from political oppression, because the alleged rescue
net is too selectively cast for that. The beneficiaries must rather be seen as fortunate
darlings of politics-some of them, I'm sure, exceptionally deserving of the public's
consideration, but not nearly all of them and not, as a group, any more so than many
who've been left out. This group of beneficiaries of public leniency are something like
the gerrymandered subset of railroad retirees who were fortunately grandfathered
into "dual benefits." See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166
(1980).
35. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
36. Digression on S. 605, title II
It is possible, but far from certain, that title ii of the Senate bill, as initially intro-
duced, does truly intend to enact the broad precept-that it does truly mean to secure
owners of property of all kinds against devaluations resulting from any and all forms
of federal regulation-although using a 33% loss floor instead of the 20% floor used
by H.R. 925. If so, however, this intention is not in the least clearly expressed. Be-
cause the title is virtually sure to be substantially revised and (let us hope) clarified,
there's little point in trying the reader's patience by placing an analysis of its current,
utterly confusing language in the main text. However, out of a sense of obligation to
tell the full story as currently available to me, I devote this humongous footnote to
that wearying task.
Title II of S. 605 is styled "Property Rights Litigation Relief." The title's "findings"
and "purposes" sections make clear that its chief aim is to simplify and expedite the
judicial and other procedures by which owners who have suffered takings of their
property for public use can obtain the just compensation to which they are constitu-
tionally entitled. See S. 605, supra note 3, §§ 201, 202. Accordingly and necessarily,
"property" protected by title II is not limited to land but is sweepingly defined to
mean "all property protected under the fifth amendment," whether realty or person-
alty. Id. § 203(5). By the same token, the scope of title II's protective sweep is not
and cannot be restricted to agency actions under two or three selected laws; it ex-
tends, as it must, to any federal government action. See id §§ 203(7), 204(a).
At this point, though, we encounter a head-spinning puzzle in the text of title II as
initially introduced. Id. § 204(a) sets up a double-barrelled test for an owner's eligi-
bility to seek compensation under its new-model procedures. First, it must be the case
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Suppose H.R. 925 were redrafted so as to look like what title II of S.
605 may intend. The promise of compensation for market-value
"losses" of twenty percent or more would, then, extend to all federal
regulatory laws and to property holdings of all kinds. In palpable
jeopardy, then, would be not just three laws of uncertain popularity
that are especially disliked by loggers, builders, and farmers, but also
that "private property ... has been physically invaded or taken for public use." Id.
§ 204(a)(1). Second-additionally-it must be the case that at least one of five fur7
ther conditions is met. See id. § 204(a)(2). Three of these additional conditions are
evidently meant to track criteria for compensable takings developed in decisions of
the Supreme Court construing the Fifth Amendment. See id. § 204(a)(2)(A)-(C). A
fourth, more compendious, is satisfied by "any ... circumstance where a taking has
occurred within the meaning of the fifth amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion." Id. § 204(a)(2)(E). The fifth additional condition is the one that concerns us
here. It calls for compensation whenever, in addition to its being the case that prop-
erty was "taken," it's furthermore the case that the agency action in question "dimin-
ishes the fair market value of the affected portions of the property ... by 33 percent
or more." Id. § 204(a)(2)(D).
Taken literally, this assemblage of provisions does not say that a 33%-or-larger dim-
inution of value gives rise to a compensation entitlement (which would, of course,
deviate markedly from the Supreme Court's holding in the Lucas case). The full as-
semblage says, rather, that such a diminution is compensable when resulting from an
agency action that also has, as one of its consequences, that private property has been
"taken." But what means "taken?"
Title II's definitions section, § 203(7), contains a definition of "taking of private
property," so we had better now have a look at that. From it, we learn that this term
encompasses "any action whereby private property is directly taken as to require
compensation under the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution." Id
§ 203(7). A court abiding by the Lucas decision would easily conclude that a diminu-
tion in value of more that 33% resulting from regulatory action does not meet this
test. However, § 203(7)'s definition of "taking of private property" goes further. It
also includes "any action whereby private property is directly taken as to require com-
pensation.., under this Act." Id.
There are two parts of "this Act" that might be read as requiring compensation for
a more than 33% value diminution. One is § 204(a)(2)(D), which, as we've seen,
requires compensation for such diminutions, but only when the agency action also
results in a "taking of property." At this point, title II is talking in circles, and there's
simply no telling whether the drafters meant, by title II, to require compensation for
all such diminutions sustained by all sorts of property under all sorts of federal regula-
tory programs.
The other part of "this Act" that can be read as requiring compensation for a more
than 33% value diminutions caused by federal regulatory action is, of course, title V.
Title V, however, offers only highly circumscribed protection of this type, protection
limited to landed property affected by one of two named regulatory programs. See
supra note 14. Perhaps the most reasonable conclusion is that title II does not mean
to set at naught title V's careful circumscription of "33-plus" protection (as we may
call it).
All that can really be said with confidence, though, is that the two titles are appar-
ently disconsonant regarding the scope of 33-plus protection. As for what the drafters
who packaged the two seemingly disconsonant titles into one bill may actually have
had in mind regarding this question, perhaps the safest conclusion is that they were
undecided, and allowed the bill to be introduced with a view to working out an an-
swer in committee and floor deliberations to come. My own view, as I've already
indicated, is that the drafters would have had the most compelling of reasons for such
indecision, namely, that neither choice is tenable.
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the labor and workplace laws, the anti-discrimination laws, the anti-
trust and regulated-industry laws, the banking and securities and
trade-regulation laws, the food and drug and labelling laws, the air-
pollution laws. None of these laws is primarily aimed at preventing
"identifiable damages" to other property, and all of them have impor-
tant applications that do not primarily aim, either, at preventing what
H.R. 925 probably means by "identifiable hazards" to public health
and safety.37 And yet these applications can easily be seen as limiting
the use of property in ways that can be considerably costly to property
owners.
Take, for example, a case of property in the form of a manufactur-
ing plant and an owner who makes a credible case that the market
value of property holding at this location would be enhanced by, say,
thirty percent if either of the following classes of regulation were
lifted: wages and hours, or collective bargaining. Actually, it would
probably take some pretty nifty economic analysis to work such mat-
ters out. You would have to know and show a lot about the competi-
tive structure of the market in which the manufacturer was selling.
But suppose he has unorganized competition, so that being subjected
to collective bargaining laws does, in fact, seriously reduce the net rev-
enue stream he could otherwise expect from his factory operation. 8
And suppose that he competes with products from abroad so that the
imposition of wage and hour laws has a comparable effect.
Our owner, then, shows that there has been a more than twenty
percent devaluation. Now, neither of these classes of regulation is go-
ing to be subsumed under H.R. 925's exemption for laws primarily
aimed at preventing either identifiable damage to other property or
identifiable hazards to public health or safety.39 So does our owner in
this case collect compensation for having to pay the minimum wage or
for having to bargain in good faith with a labor board-certified union?
What escape is there from that conclusion?
H.R. 925 contains a stipulation that an agency action "limits the use
of property" (in the way that counts for purposes of the bill) only "if a
particular legal right to use [the] property no longer exists because of
the action."40 Our owner, it seems, can easily bring his case within
that stipulation. He says, "look, here is a particular right I used to
have: the right to use this factory property for a fourteen-hour-per-day
piece-work shop, at a monthly labor cost of $xxx (here are my books
for the past year to prove it), as long as I could find folks willing to
work for that (which I still can). May it please the court, my former
37. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
38. The assumption is that he can't raise prices to cover additional labor costs
without unacceptable loss of market share, but also that his reduced net revenues still
remain his most economically favorable use for the property with its standing factory.
39. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
40. H.R. 925, supra note 3, § 10(2).
1995]
420 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VI
right to that effect no longer exists, now that the agency has cited me
for violation of the wage law (or the bargaining law)." On what basis
could a judge say him nay?4
Now I ask you: would the American public endorse this, or anything
much like it, as their compact? If you carefully told the people that a
bill carried implications as sweeping as what we have just described-
all the while assuring them that it did so in the name of a higher-law
mandate to respect property rights-would they understand?; agree?;
approve?; or none of the above? Would such a redrafted bill have the
least chance of becoming law?
Sponsors and supporters of H.R. 925 and S. 605 are faced with a
serious dilemma. An across-the-board demand for compensation in
every case in which federal government regulation (beyond the scope
of "nuisance" law narrowly conceived) renders a property holding
worth substantially less on the market than if unrestricted would have
implications that Americans would not remotely accept as consonant
with their full constitutional compact. That consequence may be
avoidable by narrowing the protected class of property to land, and
the offending regulatory schemes to three hand-picked ones, but not
without leaving what pretends to be an act of high political conscience
exposed as pork-barrel legislation, meaning legislation for a politically
favored but not otherwise relatively deserving constituency.
No doubt the current congressional majority has it within its power
to enact such a law. The courts will not interfere nor, probably, ought
they to do so. The country isn't likely to rebel. Within the larger re-
sulting unfairness-of waste and windfall-individual cases here and
there will get fairer treatment. In short, politics as usual. So what,
after all, is the problem?
In part, the problem is the cheapening of the rhetorics of property,
conscience, and compact. It likely is not a long-run service to consti-
tutional government to misuse them so flagrantly. In part, the prob-
lem is betrayal of the compact by pretense that the regulatory taking
problem, recalcitrantly multi-dimensional as it is, can be handled at
wholesale with a simple statutory formula. Long experience teaches
otherwise: it can only be handled at retail, as pre-Lucas courts at-
tempted with the balancing test.42 Lucas itself requires nothing differ-
41. The example is easily extendible to the other classes of federal regulation I
mentioned above: anti-discrimination, antitrust and regulated industries, banking and
securities and trade-regulation, food and drug and labelling, and air pollution. A
moderately able judge would have little trouble reaching and defending a conclusion,
for example, that a divestiture order in a monopolization case, or an order to cease
and desist from discriminatory pricing or insufficient labeling of a product manufac-
tured at or sold from a particular location, destroyed a previously existent "particular
legal right" to use "property" in a certain way.
42. I don't mean to insist that only case-by-case, judicial "balancing" will do. I
think it would make a great deal of sense for Congress to take up regulatory programs
one by one to try to arrive at fair formulas for compensability and compensation that
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ent except in the rare case of total extinguishment of the economic
value of a landholding.
are tailored to these programs. The case of an owner of a family-sized building lot
who unexpectedly discovers it to be the last remaining habitat for an animal species is
not the same as that of an investor in 5,000 acres in a river valley who "unexpectedly"
discovers that some of the land is a swamp-as-defined-by-law, even a newly enacted
law. Any so-called "property rights" law will have to be responsive to such differ-
ences if it wants to claim resonance with the American historical compact.
1995]

